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a psychodynamic perspective
George E. Vaillant, MD
What are involuntary 
coping mechanisms?
esilience can be defined as the capacity to
recover following stress or trauma by adopting healthy
strategies for coping with trauma and stress. Psychopatho-
logical response to stress may be considered from two per-
spectives. The first perspective emphasizes pathological
consequences of stress, such as impaired brain function,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), hippocampal
shrinkage, or elevations in serum cortisol levels. 
The second perspective focuses on how an individual’s
integrated central nervous system alters and copes with
the stressor. In this case, the result of stress is seen not as
nonspecific depression and anxiety, but as a set of dif-
ferentiated creative but involuntary behaviors that may
range from elaborate delusional systems to Beethoven
warding off suicidal depression by inserting Schiller’s
Ode to Joy into his Ninth Symphony. This second per-
spective is the orientation of this report. A fever is a cop-
ing response, not a sign of illness. 
If response to stress can be viewed from two vantage
points—pathological or coping, coping responses to stress
can be divided into three broad categories. The first cop-
ing category involves voluntarily eliciting help from
appropriate others, for example, by mobilizing social sup-
ports. The second coping category involves voluntary
strategies like information gathering, anticipating danger,
and rehearsing responses to danger.
1 The third coping
category, like fever and leukocytosis, is involuntary. It
entails deploying unconscious homeostatic mechanisms
that reduce the disorganizing effects of sudden stress.
366
Brief report
Copyright © 2011 LLS SAS.  All rights reserved
Keywords: ego defense mechanism; resilience; homeostasis; PTSD and involun-
tary coping
Author affiliations: Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School; The Study of
Adult Development, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts,
USA  
Address for correspondence: George E. Vaillant, MD, Massachusetts General
Hospital, 151 Merrimac Street, 2nd floor, Boston, MA 02114, USA
(e-mail: gvaillant@partners.org)
Coping responses to stress can be divided into three
broad categories. The first coping category involves vol-
untarily mobilizing social supports. The second category
involves voluntary coping strategies like rehearsing
responses to danger. The third coping category, like
fever and leukocytosis, is involuntary. It entails deploy-
ing unconscious homeostatic mechanisms that reduce
the disorganizing effects of sudden stress. DSM-5 offers
a tentative hierarchy of defenses, from psychotic to
immature to mature. The 70-year prospective Study of
Development at Harvard provides a clinical validation
of this hierarchy. Maturity of coping predicted psy-
chosocial adjustment to aging 25 years later, and was
associated with not developing symptoms of post-trau-
matic stress disorder after very severe WWII combat.
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Such coping mechanisms (shortened to defenses for this
paper) have more to do with adaptation to life than with
Freud’s “psychoanalysis.” Despite the emerging dialogue
between neuroscience and dynamic psychiatry, the chem-
ical processes and neuronal assemblies underlying invol-
untary defenses have not been identified.
Not long ago at an amusement park, I watched my
grandson ride the loop-the-loop roller coaster with
astonishment. As he hung suspended upside down 30
meters above the ground, I saw that for him the experi-
ence was one of joy, release, and exhilaration. I imagined
that for myself the ride might produce panic. By what
alchemy had the chemistry of his brain, hardwired to feel
lasting fear at dangerous heights, left him without resid-
ual distress? Who is sane and who is crazy—the excited
teen or the phobic grandfather? 
Choice of defense is involuntary, but so-called “mature
defenses” (eg, sublimation and humor) rather than
“immature defenses” (eg, projection and hypochondria-
sis) can make an enormous difference in mental health.
But even the most “pathologic” defenses serve to calm.
Early 19th-century medical phenomenologists viewed
pus, fever, and coughing as evidence of disease; late 19th-
century pathophysiologists learned to regard these
symptoms as evidence of the body’s healthy efforts to
cope with infectious insult. Similarly, immature defense
mechanisms like imaginary friends (fantasy), temper
tantrums (acting out), and self-mutilation (passive
aggression) produce behaviors that appear annoying
and/or pathological to others but in fact reflect the
brain’s homeostatic effort to cope with sudden changes
in the brain’s internal and external environment. In both
deafness and traumatic brain injury, the usually mal-
adaptive defense of projection helps to provide subjec-
tive order to a disordered brain. The difficulty is that
often, as with hypnosis, defenses like my grandson’s
denial of danger compromise other facets of cognition. 
Perhaps Freud’s most original contribution to human
psychology was his inductive postulation in 1894 that
unconscious “defense mechanisms” protect the individ-
ual from painful emotions, ideas, and realities.
2 Freud
observed that not only could emotion be “dislocated or
transposed” from ideas (by the mechanism Freud would
later call isolation) but also that emotion could be “reat-
tached” to other ideas (by displacement) and that the
idea accompanying the emotion could be “forgotten” by
repression. Consider, for example the different responses
of different people to the immediate aftermath of 9/11. 
Classification of defenses
Defenses have six important properties
3:
￿ They mitigate the distressing effects of both emotion
and cognitive dissonance 
￿ They are unconscious (or, otherwise stated, involun-
tary) 
￿ They are discrete from one another
￿ Although often the hallmarks of major psychiatric syn-
dromes, they are dynamic and, unlike the brain disease
they mimic, are reversible 
￿ They can be adaptive, even creative, as well as patho-
logical
￿ If to the user defenses are invisible, to the observer
defenses appear odd, even annoying.
Clinicians must learn to perceive a patient’s often irri-
tating, even disgusting, defenses as lifesaving, as the
Viennese hematologist Julius Cohnheim learned to per-
ceive disgusting pus as “laudable.” For example,
hypochondriacal help-rejecting complaints often seen in
inarticulate trauma victims lead to anger and unwitting
retaliation on the part of the clinician. Like understand-
ing a foreign language, the discovery of past trauma not
in the chart permits the clinician to be empathic towards
the patient’s unconsciously angry demands.
Although in every effort to produce a comprehensive list
of defenses, there will be enormous semantic disagree-
ment,
4 over the last 30 years several longitudinal studies
at Berkeley
5 and at Harvard
6 have clarified our under-
standing. Empirical studies reviewed by Cramer
7 and
Skodol and Perry
8 finally organized defenses into a con-
sensual hierarchy of relative psychopathology. By offer-
ing a tentative hierarchy and glossary of consensually
validated definitions, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV),
9
hardly a psychoanalytic document, has included a
Defensive Functioning Scale (pp 751-753) adapted from
Vaillant, 1971,
10 as a proposed diagnostic axis.
The hierarchy has four levels. At the first level are psy-
chotic defenses (common in PTSD): delusional projection,
psychotic denial, and psychotic distortion. These mecha-
nisms are common in young children, in our dreams, and
in psychosis. To breach them requires altering the brain
by neuroleptics or waking the dreamer.
At the second level are immature defenses (also common
in PTSD): acting out (eg, My Lai Massacre); passive
aggression (cutting oneself); autistic fantasy; dissociation
(out-of-body experience during torture, multiple per-
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sonalities common after childhood abuse); and projec-
tion (paranoia). The relatively maladaptive defenses
found in the second level are common in adolescents, in
substance abusers, in personality disorders, and in brain
injury. Defenses in this category rarely respond to ver-
bal interpretation alone. 
The third level are intermediate (neurotic) defenses.
Defensive functioning at this level keeps potentially
threatening ideas, feelings, memories, wishes, or fears out
of awareness. Examples are: displacement (kicking the
dog instead of the boss), isolation (a surgeon thinking
the Whipple operation for pancreatic cancer is interest-
ing) repression, the opposite of isolation—feeling with-
out thinking. These intermediate defenses are manifested
clinically by phobias, compulsions, somatizations, and
amnesias. In contrast to the immature defenses, inter-
mediate defenses usually make the user more uncom-
fortable than the observer. They can often be breached
with psychotherapy.
At the fourth level are mature defenses. If immature
defenses are most common in adolescents, mature
defenses increase with age
11 just as PTSD decreases with
age. These defenses usually maximize gratification and
allow relatively more conscious awareness of feelings,
ideas, and their consequences. Examples of defenses at this
level are: altruism, sublimation, suppression, and humor.
For example, although humor appears to reflect denial
and dissociation, humor, like meditation, helps shift the
body’s autonomic sympathetic agitation to parasympa-
thetic calm. Black humor on the battlefield and in the
operating theater reflect such examples of transforma-
tion of terror into relaxation. Thus, not only do defenses
lie along a continuum of relative psychopathology; they
also lie along a continuum of personality maturation.
11
With the passage of decades and the continuing myelin-
ization of frontal lobe connections to the limbic system,
12
the defense of adolescent acting out (eg, temporarily
comforting shoplifting) could evolve into reaction for-
mation (becoming a strict policeman) and finally into
the altruism of a parole officer. 
Immature defenses can be breached in three ways. First,
by confrontation—often by a group of supportive
peers—or by videotaped empathic but focused psy-
chotherapy.
13 Second, immature defenses can be
breached by improving intrapsychic competence by ren-
dering the individual less anxious and lonely through
empathy, or less tired and hungry through food and rest.
Third, improving brain function, (for example, sobriety
or relieving normal-pressure hydrocephalus). At present
few evidence-based treatment results are available,
except for a small body of literature on change in
defenses over treatment and time.
3,14
At present we have only clinical evidence to support the
importance and the clinical utility of the concept of a
hierarchy of defenses. The Study of Adult Development
at Harvard University offers one such experimental clin-
ical setting. The Study consists of three cohorts of ado-
lescents followed for a lifetime: The College cohort
(Harvard sophomores selected for mental health in
1940),
6 The Core City cohort, (socioeconomically
deprived, but nondelinquent, inner city adolescents
selected in 1940)
16 and the Terman cohort, (California
grammar school girls with high IQs selected for longitu-
dinal study in 1922).
16,17 Evidence of involuntary coping
was obtained by 2-hour interviews with the subjects
between 45 and 80. Independent raters, blind to the
future, using the rating of theoretical “maturity” and
adaptiveness outlined earlier, achieved labeling of cop-
ing mechanisms. Rater reliability was adequate.
18
For all three samples the maturity of each subject’s cop-
ing choice was assessed along a 9-point scale: 1 equaled
men and women only using mature defenses, and 9
equaled individuals only using immature defenses. Table I
illustrates that, analogous to blood clotting mechanisms,
defense choice is relatively unaffected by parental social
class, IQ, and education.
11 Table II illustrates that matu-
rity of defense mechanism predicts successful aging and
income for the College sample and Core City sample.
19
(Only objective physical deterioration after age 50
seemed independent of mature coping).
6
In order to assess the relevance of maturity of defenses
to symptoms of PTSD, the Study took advantage of the
fact that most of the College sample (studied prospec-
tively from 1938 to 2011) served in World War II.
20,21 and
Antecedent “Maturity” of defenses
College Core City Terman
n = 154
a n = 189
a n = 40
Years of education .13 .10 .33*
IQ .04 .14 .07
Parental social class .11 .00 .13
Table I. Correlation of social antecedents with adaptiveness of defenses.
a. Sample size is reduced. In order to control confounders, men
with IQ<86, depression, alcohol dependence, and schizophrenia
have been excluded. *P<.05, Spearman correlation coefficient
was the statistic used.
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had been extensively studied in college before the war.
Immediately after serving overseas in World War II, they
were extensively debriefed on their combat experiences,
their physical symptoms during combat, and their per-
sisting symptoms of stress. Forty years later, 107 surviv-
ing men filled out questionnaires reflecting persisting
symptoms of PTSD. Men with high combat exposure
continued to report increased symptoms of PTSD.
Combat exposure and number of physiological symp-
toms during combat—but not during civilian stress—
predicted symptoms of PTSD in 1946 and 1988. 
Men with high combat exposure reported 20 times as
many symptoms of PTSD as those with low exposure.
Sixteen men had very high combat exposure but no
reported PTSD symptoms either in 1946 or 40 years
later. When contrasted with men who experienced PTSD
symptoms after similar combat exposure, these 16
resilient men did not manifest less neuroticism or less
severe combat; but they did as young adults manifest
more “mature” defenses. The 16 men with high combat
exposure and mature defenses (age 20 to 47) reported
only an eighth as many PTSD symptoms as the 18 men
with similarly high combat exposure and less mature
defenses (F 9.5, P=.000 two-tailed, df=33). However this
example does not exclude the possibility that brains
altered by PTSD, like brains altered by traumatic brain
injury (eg, Phineas Gage) or alcohol, subsequently man-
ifest less mature mechanisms.
At present many imaging studies have illuminated the
brain circuits underlying PTSD,
22,23 social anxiety, and
phobia.
24 Only a few
25-27 have begun tentatively to under-
stand how the brain adapts (downregulates) the effects
of conflict. A study by Westen et al
28 helped clarify the
brain pathways by which partisan voters altered unwel-
come facts. The brain “reward” neurons in the striatum
and nucleus accumbens appeared to be involved, pro-
viding a basis for reinforcing specific mechanism choices
for downregulation. A recent study by Nili and col-
leagues
29 illuminates a putative pathway leading to
downregulation of (or dissociation from) fear. Hopefully,
the next 10 years of neuroimaging will bring increasing
clarity to the field. 
Conclusion
The concept of involuntary coping mechanisms, (the
“politically correct” renaming of the now outmoded (?)
term, “ego mechanisms of defense”), is too valuable to
be discarded by neuroscience because of its association
with Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. The diagnostic
and prognostic validity of such “mechanisms” in longi-
tudinal studies more than make up for their unreliabil-
ity and difficulty in rating. The task of neuroscience is to
continue to use neuroimaging to identify and to under-
stand the neural connections of such mechanisms. ❏
Core City College
n = 137
a n = 154
a
“Mature” coping  “Mature” coping
(1-9) (1-9)
I. Objective evidence








Marital satisfaction (midlife) .30*** .18*
Subjective physical functioning
b .32*** .23*





Table II. Late-life consequences of adaptive defenses at age 20 to 47.
Spearman correlation coefficient (rho) was the statistic used.
*P<.05 **P<.01 ***P<.001 a. Sample size is reduced because
men who died before age 65 are excluded. b. Measured at age
65 for the Core City men and measured at age 75 for the
College men. c. 1 = well, 2 = minor irreversible illness, 3 =
chronic illness, 4 = disabling illness, 5 = dead.
34 Measured at age
60 for Core City men and at age 70 for College men. 
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Mecanismos de adaptación involuntarios:
una perspectiva psicodinámica
Las respuestas de adaptación al estrés se pueden
dividir en tres grandes categorías. La primera de
ellas incluye la movilización voluntaria de los apo-
yos sociales. En la segunda categoría están las estra-
tegias de adaptación voluntaria como las respuestas
de entrenamiento ante el peligro. La tercera cate-
goría de adaptación es involuntaria, como la fiebre
y la leucocitosis. Esto implica desplegar los mecanis-
mos homeostáticos inconscientes que reducen los
efectos desorganizadores del estrés agudo. El DSM-
V ofrece una jerarquía provisional de defensas que
van desde lo psicótico a lo inmaduro y lo maduro. El
Estudio sobre el Desarrollo, de tipo prospectivo por
70 años realizado en Harvard proporciona una vali-
dación clínica de esta jerarquía. La madurez en la
adaptación predijo el ajuste psicosocial a los efectos
de la edad 25 años más tarde  y se asoció con la
ausencia de la aparición de síntomas del trastorno
por estrés postraumático luego de combates muy
graves de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Mécanismes involontaires d’adaptation: 
une perspective psychodynamique
Les stratégies d’adaptation au stress peuvent être
divisées en trois grandes catégories. La première
comprend des supports sociaux à mobilisation
volontaire. La deuxième comprend des stratégies
d’adaptation volontaires comme la préparation des
réponses au danger. La troisième catégorie, comme
la fièvre et la leucocytose, est involontaire. Elle sup-
pose le déploiement de mécanismes homéosta-
tiques inconscients qui réduisent les effets désor-
ganisateurs d’un stress soudain. Le DSM-V présente
une hiérarchie de la tentative des défenses allant
de psychotique à immature à mature. L’étude pros-
pective de 70 ans du Développement conduite à
Harvard apporte une validation clinique de cette
hiérarchie. Ainsi, la maturité de la stratégie d’adap-
tation a permis de prédire l’ajustement aux effets
de l’âge 25 ans plus tard, et était associée à une
absence de développement de l’état de stress post-
traumatique après des combats très sévères durant
la seconde guerre mondiale. 
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